COMPARATIVE RISK: WHAT MAKES A
SUCCESSFUL PROJECT?
DEBRA GUTENSON*
ABSTRACT
The comparative risk process brings together diverse stakeholders
to reach a consensus on which environmental problems pose the most
risk to human health, ecosystem health and quality of life. In addition,
comparative risk seeks to develop a consensus on an action plan to reduce those risks. Over the last ten years, almost forty states, tribes, and
localities have initiated or completed a comparative risk project. What
have we learned from these experiences, and are there some general
characteristics of projects that can help to ensure success?
I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent meeting, Mike DiBartolomeis, the project director
for the California comparative risk project, remarked that many have
pointed to air legislation in the State of Washington as an example of
1
the success of comparative risk projects. He also observed, however,
that he had not seen a report documenting similar results from more
2
recent projects. As the number of completed and ongoing projects
now totals thirty-nine, his statements struck a chord. Certainly the
successes are numerous. It simply could not be the case that these
enormous expenditures of money, time, and energy were continuously amounting to nothing … could it?
Outside of the comparative risk practitioners’ circles, the accomplishments of the comparative risk process have gone relatively
unheralded. While this might be interpreted as a failure, a more
careful examination suggests otherwise. First, comparative risk loses
its distinct identity and becomes part of a locally or state driven effort. This is evidenced by the actual titles of the projects where comparative risk and/or EPA are rarely acknowledged (“Environment
1991: Risks to Vermont and Vermonters”; “Washington Environ-

* Senior Analyst of the Regional and State Planning Division of the Office of Policy
Planning and Evaluation in the Environmental Protection Agency. Present Address: Regional
and State Planning Division, OPPE/OSPED (mail code 2165), US EPA, 401 M Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20460-0001.
1. See Washington Clean Air Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §70.94 (West 1991).
2. See Green Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy, The Resource Guide to
Comparative Risk (3rd ed., 1997) <http://www.gmied.org>.
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ment 2010”; “Regional Environmental Priorities Project - Cleveland,
Ohio”; “Priorities 95 - Columbus, Ohio”; “The Elizabeth River Project - Norfolk, VA;” “LEAP to 2000: The Louisiana Environmental
3
Action Plan”). We applaud, even encourage, this “ownership” of the
process.
Furthermore, many of the risk management strategies being considered and implemented are not actually conducted by the public
advisory committee that was involved with the comparative risk project, but rather by one of the stakeholder groups in the process, or by
a completely different task force that received at least some momentum and consensus from the comparative risk process. Being able to
track activities back to a process that does not have much public
identification in the first place is a fairly meaningless measure of success.
Finally, as change generally transpires slowly and at the margins,
progress and success are difficult to track. Large-scale sudden shifts
in priorities and spending patterns do not represent the typical results
of comparative risk projects. Instead, it has become apparent that
the most profound and meaningful product which the projects yield is
the creation of true partnerships within and across bureaucracies,
academia, industry and the community at large. Such intangible results, usually described as “bridge building” or “networking,” are
simply not newsworthy and rarely reported.
Despite the lack of public recognition, genuine progress is being
made toward improved environmental decision-making. The purpose of this paper is to share our experiences to date with comparative risk projects, determine the practical merits of the comparative
risk process, and articulate some of the lessons we have learned along
the way.
II. WHY COMPARATIVE RISK?
In 1993, eighteen percent of EPA=s proposed total budget was
devoted to higher risk areas and approximately thirty percent of the
4
proposed 1994 budget was devoted to higher risk areas. These num-

3. See id.
4. “Higher-risk areas” include the following: indoor air; radon; worker exposure; global
climate change; stratospheric ozone; pesticides; wetlands and habitat alteration; drinking water;
nonpoint sources; criteria air pollutants; estuaries, coasts and oceans; and air toxics. See Debra
H. Gutenson & Susan L. Santos, Risk Communication and Public Involvement Methods in
Comparative Projects, Presented at the Society for Risk Analysis 2 (Dec. 7, 1993) (copy on file
with the author).
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bers raise some important questions. For example, who or what
drives these decisions on how our budget is allocated? Is it the EPA
Administrator, Congress, environmental activists, industry lobbyists,
or the current crisis of the week? Also, how are these decisions
made? On what basis or criteria did we decide what percentage of
our total Agency budget should be devoted to higher risk environmental problems?
In reality, there has been no overriding decision-making process
for the setting of priorities or, for that matter, any agreement on who
should make such decisions. In fact, my former boss liked to compare EPA=s budgeting process to rowing a boat. We are always
looking backward, where we have already been. Each budget cycle,
we take last year’s budget, and fiddle with it to see what would happen if we have five percent more or less this year. Comparative risk
represents an effort to look toward an agreed upon goal in the future,
a point along the horizon.
Comparative risk is a collection of methodologies or tools that
are used to determine the relative risks to human health, ecosystem
health and quality of life across a wide array of environmental problem areas within a specific geographic location. Comparative risk
projects are usually conducted in two phases. Phase one is the risk
analysis phase, which results in risk ranking across all problem areas.
Yet, while we need to improve our scientific understanding of the nature and magnitude of the risks, more and better data will never be
able to tell us how to spend limited dollars. As such, we still need
some way to rationally decide how to allocate our budget among diverse and uncertain risks. Phase two, therefore, is the risk management step; once the relative risks are known, given political, legal and
cultural constraints, a plan is formulated to bring about the greatest
risk reduction. The Agency has risk assessment guidelines that help
to characterize and make sense of epidemiology data, animal studies
5
and ancillary data for individual chemicals. This is not without con6
troversy, judgment or criticism. However, until there is a preferable
alternative, risk assessment is a scientific process of organizing the information we have in order to make some decisions. And so it is with
5. See COMMITTEE ON INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC
HEALTH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
6. See, e.g., John Kadvang, From Comparative risk to Decision Analysis, Presented to the
Society for Risk Analysis (Dec. 1994); WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISKBASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, eds.,
1994).

72

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 8:69

comparative risk: it is a process (reproducible and documentable) of
organizing the information we have in order to make better decisions.
Not perfect decisions, but better decisions.
III. EPA=S COMPARATIVE RISK EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY
Today’s EPA-supported comparative risk projects bridge science
and public values by involving diverse stakeholders in a decisionmaking process at the level of state and local governments. Comparative risk, however, did not always reach this level of proactive
planning. What follows is a brief review of the most significant
events in the evolution of the comparative risk process.
During the 1980=s, the forerunner of the Regional and State
Planning Division at EPA (“RSPD”) sponsored Integrated Environmental Management Projects (“IEMPs”), community based environmental protection projects in Santa Clara, CA; Philadelphia, PA;
7
Baltimore, MD; Denver, CO; and the Kanawha Valley, WV. The
goal of the IEMPs was to develop ways of using risk and cost infor8
mation to improve local environmental decision-making capabilities.
The projects proposed using quantitative risk analysis as a logical
common denominator for establishing risk reduction priorities across
media, tracking unintended pollution transfers resulting from regula9
tion, and measuring environmental progress. In reality, the projects
were quite expensive at over one million dollars each, and extremely
10
They relied on primary data collection, actual
time consuming.
monitoring and modeling, focused only on cancer-related health effects and had no on-going local planning or management institu11
tions. Furthermore, the IEMPs were conducted at a time when the
Agency was still completely in the point source, command and control regulatory mode. The following fundamentals were gleaned
from these trial projects:
$Environmental planning and management did not occur naturally at the local level, particularly when dealing with industrial
sources of specific pollutants associated with cancer-related health

7. See Memorandum on Integrated Environmental Management Projects and Comparative Risk Projects, Regulatory Integration Division of the Office of Policy Analysis (OPPE)
(1988) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter OPPE Memo].
8. See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation,
Geographic Integration Projects (1987).
9. See OPPE Memo, supra note 7.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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effects.12 Instead, the IEMPs had to create local planning and management institutions (advisory committees) which usually disbanded
13
after the projects were completed. Lasting improvements in the local planning and management decision-making processes, therefore,
14
were not achieved.
$Broad community participation led to public understanding
15
and acceptance of results and decisions. Local officials were thus
involved in virtually every step of the project, particularly in the risk
16
management phase.
$In spite of large resources devoted to primary data collection,
the IEMPs often lacked the scientific credibility needed for making
17
decisions on specific environmental pollutants. The analysis was,
however, always credible enough to set management priorities among
18
problems.
In 1986, the Agency responded to a request from Administrator
Lee Thomas to examine relative risks to human health and the envi19
ronment which are posed by various environmental problems. The
resulting work, “Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of
20
Environmental Problems” (“Unfinished Business”), is a landmark
study in that it established the framework and methodology for the
comparative risk process. The task force, comprised of seventy-five
Agency professionals, reached a consensus about the relative risks
which the Administrator described as a Acredible first step toward a
promising method of analyzing, developing, and implementing envi21
ronmental policy.”
Finally, in 1987, the forerunner to RSPD began a five-year plan
of developing, demonstrating and institutionalizing risk-based planning in EPA regions and states. Regional and state comparative risk
projects were initiated as pilots in EPA Regions 1, 3, 10, and in Vermont, Washington, and Colorado. Furthermore, Deputy Administrator Hank Habicht, upon seeing the results of the three regional proj12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id.
See id..
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987).
20. Id.
21. Id at ii.
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ects, asked that the remaining seven regions also complete comparative risk projects by the next annual planning meeting. The regional
projects were smaller versions of Unfinished Business. Focusing on
EPA-related activities, they were conducted in-house and had little, if
any, public involvement.
The early state pilots in Vermont, Washington and Colorado, on
the other hand, took the comparative risk process to the next level.
These projects combined the lessons learned from the IEMP studies
with the basic methodology for assessing and comparing risks from
Unfinished Business; that is, using existing data for the purposes of
guiding environmental priority-setting decisions rather than for
regulatory standard setting purposes. Through community participa22
tion, these projects achieved institutionalized priority-setting among
such environmental issues as cancer risks, non-cancer health effects,
ecological risks, and a hybrid category of effects usually referred to as
quality of life impacts (economic, social and cultural effects). Interestingly, although we now feel that the second and third generations
of comparative risk projects have improved in many respects, we continue to point to the specific tangible results achieved during this first
generation. (The complete listing of comparative risk projects to
date is included in the Appendix at the end of this paper.)
Recent comparative risk projects have continued to expand on
the initial set of principles and feature a strengthened emphasis on
23
meaningful public participation, action and implementation. Efforts
to tie the priority-setting process to a process for monitoring respective results have led projects to develop visions, goals and futures
scenarios, coordinate with broader environmental planning efforts,
and develop indicator systems for tracking progress.

22. See OPPE Memo, supra note 7.
23. In order to receive cooperative agreement funds from EPA to conduct a comparative
risk project, the applicant must convince the Agency of a commitment to the following:
$participation of key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders
$extensive public participation
$analysis of human health, ecosystem health and quality of life risks
$ranking of environmental risks
$development of risk management strategies
Beyond an agreement to perform these core activities, the process may be customized to meet
individual project needs. While EPA offers guidance, training and suggestions on such matters
as specific committee structure and membership, timing and sequencing of events, the actual
analysis and ranking, and building and maintaining community support and interest, the actual
decisions are client driven—the project participants, not EPA, make the decisions.
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IV. RESULTS
The results of comparative risk projects vary widely, in part due
to the diversity of specific goals that each project strives to attain.
This partial listing of accomplishments highlights the array of outcomes on both the state and local level.

$Washington - Several pieces of legislation including the Washington Clean Air Act of 1991 were enacted as a result of the creation
of priorities and consensus-building among the state and local agen24
cies.
$Vermont - The Department of Health initiated a new indoor
25
air program.
$Colorado - The program office came to the table with substantive issues, and thus were able to find the needed flexibility within the
26
existing system to address proposed risk management strategies.
$Louisiana - A consensus-building approach brought together
diverse groups (e.g., multiple agencies, NGOs, industry, citizens, etc.)
27
for the first time to work toward common goals.
$Ohio - Governor Voinovich allocated $500,000 for environmental education activities that focus on work assembled through the
28
Ohio Comparative Risk project.
$Norfolk, Virginia - Community consensus on the Elizabeth
River clean-up activities has attracted almost one million dollars of
investments to support such activities as inventorying and monitoring
the toxic impacts on rivers by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, the removal of abandoned vessels, the restoration of
an area of degraded tidal wetlands, the production of a detailed study
by the Army Corps of Engineers examining ways to restore water

24. See RICHARD MINARD & KENNETH JONES, THE NORTHEAST CTR. FOR COMRISK, STATE COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECTS: A FORCE FOR CHANGE 19 (1993)
[hereinafter FORCE FOR CHANGE]; JOANNE DEA & SUE THOMAS, BUILDING A FOUNDATION
FOR CHANGE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN STATE COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECTS 4
(Apr. 1997) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE].
25. See FORCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 24, at 7, 75.
26. See The Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, 5 THE COMPARATIVE RISK BULLETIN 4
(July/Aug. 1995) <http://www.gmied.org>.
27. See The Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, 2 THE COMPARATIVE RISK BULLETIN
3-4 (Apr. 1992) <http://www.gmied.org>.
28. See Education at the Heart of It All in Ohio, 1 SYNERGY 7 (Nov./Dec. 1996); BUILDING
A FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, supra note 24, at 3.
PARATIVE

76

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 8:69

quality, and the initiation of environmental education programs on a
29
passenger schooner.
$Cleveland, Ohio - A focus on urban sprawl and energy consumption helped spur mayors of three inner ring suburbs to begin de30
veloping a common agenda to solve urban environmental problems.
$Utah - Risk ranking brought to light the comprehensiveness of
the water resource issues and prompted an unprecedented dialogue
and partnership between the state and local governments on environmental planning issues that went beyond traditional state-local
public health oriented partnerships. It also resulted in the Utah Department of Environmental Quality taking a community-based approach to comparative risk management by focusing on developing
growth strategies that protect water quality and enhance and develop
water resources and adequate wastewater treatment systems in a five
31
county, high growth area in southwest Utah.
$Kentucky - Kentucky is the home of the first project to explicitly attempt to incorporate future scenarios into the comparative risk
32
framework.
$Hawaii - An indoor air program was established for the first
time as a result of the high risk ranking of indoor air pollution. In
addition, Hawaii instituted a state-wide testing program to find and
treat children with elevated blood-lead levels and set up a water
testing program in selected communities as a result of identifying
populations at risk to lead who use catchment basins to collect
33
drinking water.
$Columbus, Ohio - Local efforts helped formulate a comprehen34
sive environmental policy.
$Clinton County, Ohio - As a result of comparative risk assessment, environmental issues are more openly discussed and the organizations participating in projects gained enhanced credibility
within the community. Local involvement consists of active efforts
by the Regional Planning Commission members and the Board of
29. See EDWARD DELHAGEN & JOANNE DEA, WESTERN CTR. FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISION-MAKING, COMPARATIVE RISK AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: LESSONS FROM THE ROAD i,
7 (1996) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM THE ROAD]; Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, supra
note 26, at 4.
30. See LESSONS FROM THE ROAD, supra note 29, at i.
31. See BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, supra note 24, at 4.
32. See Northeast Ctr. for Comparative Risk, 5 THE COMPARATIVE RISK BULLETIN 7
(May/June 1995). <http://www.gmied.org>.
33. See BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, supra note 24, at 3.
34. See id. at 3.
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County Commissioners who makes recommendations many of which
have already been incorporated into the county’s permit and ap35
proval process.
$Seattle, Washington - Seattle has the longest running local
comparative risk project. The project started in November 1990 and
continuously updates the action plan as the implementation contin36
ues today.
$Charlottesville, Virginia - Local agencies are incorporating
comparative risk into a broader sustainability project designed to
“describe a future where our economic, human, social, and environmental health are assured. Currently, developing benchmarks or targets for 159 indicators have been identified to measure progress to37
ward a sustainable future.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Obviously there is no way to ensure that a comparative risk
project will produce such substantial tangible and intangible results
as those listed above. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain
common methods which have consistently proven to be vital to the
process. I have, therefore, compiled a list of bullet point suggestions
for future project participants and sponsors:
$Get people to the table and talking—building trust is a slow,
time consuming process. Allow it to happen.
$Get the support of major stakeholders—if there is someone
you need involved in the process to ensure success, or someone who
has the potential to keep you from succeeding, get that person or a
representative involved from the very beginning.
$Build and maintain continuing community involvement—
projects that are tied to a specific location that can “inspire” the public or are focused on a specific agenda seem to have better success.
$Perform a risk analysis and rank the risks – it is hard and messy
and frustrating, but it is the only way to ensure that we are getting to
better informed decisions.
$Integrate comparative risk into city/local/state planning—in order to influence environmental decisions and raise awareness of environmental issues, it must be a part of a larger process that is or can be

35. See id. at 4, 7.
36. See id. at 11, 40.
37. See id. at 4-5, 52.
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institutionalized. Goal setting and indicators are critical components
of the larger process.
$Focus on implementing actions—the risk ranking is only a step
along the way, not the final step.
$Focus on just a few things to accomplish – it is easy to get lost
and lose momentum in a laundry list of proposals for action.
$Include a diverse group of stakeholders, and do not overlook
typically disenfranchised groups. Go beyond traditional blue-ribbon
panel members. Go directly to community leaders and ask them who
should be involved and in what way.
Potential stakeholders of a comparative risk project team include:

$Governor/Mayor’s office
$Legislators
$Academics
$Major business interests
$Environmental advocates
$Reporters/media
$Chamber of Commerce
$Minorities
$Farmers/dairymen/ranchers
$Tribes
$States Agencies
$Department of Environmental Protection/Quality
$Health Department
$Natural Resources Department
$Fish and Wildlife
$Energy Department
$Education Department
$Agriculture
VI. CONCLUSION
Comparative risk is by no means the only environmental planning tool available to states, tribes and localities. We encourage
planners to use whatever tool or collection of tools will best suit their
needs and goals. Communities that have participated in the comparative risk process have realized many unexpected benefits in addition to accomplishing their intended goals. As such, we are very excited that comparative risk has evolved to the point of playing an
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instrumental role in the national effort to improve environmental
management.
APPENDIX: STATUS OF RSPD PROJECTS AND STAFF CONTACTS
(APRIL 1997)
States

Tribes

Territories

Localities

Total

Completed

9

1

1

5

16

On Going

16

4

-

6

26

Planning

1

-

-

3

4

Completed Projects
Alabama – Steve Keach

California – Jim Cole

Colorado – Deb Gutenson

Florida – Steve Keach

Louisiana – Deb Gutenson

Michigan -- Deb Gutenson

Vermont – Deb Gutenson

North Dakota – Rodges Ankrah

Wisconsin Tribes – Rodges Ankrah

Washington – Deb Gutenson

Atlanta – Steve Keach

Guam – Deb Martin

Columbus – Rebecca Dils

Cleveland – Rebecca Dils

Seattle, WA – Steve Keach

Elizabeth River, VA – Rodges Ankrah

On-Going Projects
Alaska – Jim Cole

Texas – Jim Cole

Arizona – Rodges Ankrah

Utah – Jim Cole

Hawaii – Otto Gutenson

Allegheny Co., PA – Joanne Dea/DL

Iowa – Rodges Ankrah

Athens Co., OH – Rebecca Dils

Kentucky – Steve Keach

Charlottesville, VA – Steve Keach

Maine – Marilyn Katz

Hamilton Co. (Cincinnati) OH – Gabriella

Maryland – Joanne Dea/DG

Lomabardi

Minnesota – Rebecca Dils

Houston, TX – Rodges Ankrah

Mississippi – Joanne Dea/SK

Jackson, MS – Joanne Dea/SK

New Hampshire – Rebecca Dils

Region 8 Tribes – Rodges Ankrah

New Jersey – Joanne Dea/OG

Pine Ridge Oglala Sioux, SD

New York – Joanne Dea/JC

S. Ute, Durango, CO

Ohio – Rebecca Dils

Swinomish Tribe – G. Lombardi

Tennessee - Steve Keach

Coer D’Alene Tribe – G. Lombardi
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Projects in Planning

Small Grants for Indicators
Projects

Cahaba, AL – Jim Cole

Colorado

Dallas, TX – G. Lombardi

Connecticut

Delaware – Otto Gutenson

Kentucky

E. Boston, MA – Nancy Prolman

Minnesota
Montana – Otto Gutenson
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Sustainable Seattle – Steve Keach
Vermont
Washington

